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I. The New Chinese Legal System
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), China's legal system
was dismantled.' The courts were closed,2 law faculties were
disbanded,3 and adherence to any semblance of the Rule of Law was
abandoned.4 By the end of a decade of upheaval, there was essentially
no Chinese legal system.5
During subsequent years, spanning more than a quarter century,
there have been great efforts in China to build a modem legal culture.
The university law schools are now open and thriving.6 A new
generation of well-educated law graduates has begun to fill positions in
government, business, and private practice. At the same time, China's
substantive law is being modernized, so that in many respects it is similar
today to related fields of law in the West.7 China's legal enforcement
1. See Feng Chen, Chinese Bankruptcy Law: Milestones and Challenges, 31 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 49, 51 (1999) (stating that the Cultural Revolution was "[a]rguably, the
darkest period in Chinese history," during which the "legal system was completely
destroyed," "the Department of Justice disbanded," and "even the Constitution was
ignored").
2. Cf Zhong Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, Establishing the Truth on Facts: Has the
Chinese Civil Process Achieved This Goal?, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 393, 433
(2004) (describing how "the Cultural Revolution... led to the overthrow of all formal
legal institutions and everyone associated with them, including judges, lawyers, and
procurators").
3. See Jianhua & Guanghua, supra note 2, at 438 (noting that "law schools were
closed").
4. See CHENGLIN Liu, CHINESE LAW ON SARS 36 n.4 (2004) (stating that the
lawmaking process was seriously disrupted and that the convening of the new Congress
was delayed for years); id. at 40 (describing the Cultural Revolution as the "lawless
period"); Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 58
(2001) (stating that the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976 ...
disrupted any ordinary concept of law in China").
5. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some First Impressions of the Legal System in Three
Chinese Cities, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 221, 229 (1998) (stating that "there was really no
Chinese legal system" after the Cultural Revolution).
6. An excellent symbol of the progress in Chinese legal education is the new
Kenneth Wang School of Law in Suzhou. In November 2003, Soochow University
inaugurated a new law school building, constructed with funds donated by a Chinese-
American family foundation. The Kenneth Wang School of Law is the most impressive
legal education facility in the P.R.C. The building marks in bricks and mortar the re-
emergence of legal education at Soochow University, a school where comparative law
scholarship had once flourished in pre-Communist China. See generally Alison W.
Conner, Training China 's Early Modern Lawyers: Soochow University Law School, 8 J.
CHIWESE L. 1, 3 (1994) (relating that previously "Soochow [University] alone specialized
in 'comparative law"' and "[ilt was, [therefore], the only law school to offer a formal
program in 'Anglo-American law' (Yingmei fa)"). "Soochow held a pre-eminent
position: it was the best and most famous law school in south China." Id. at 4.
7. See Vincent R. Johnson, Chinese Law and American Legal Education, 31 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1, 4 (1999) (stating that China's new contract law "incorporates such
'Western' notions as freedom to contract, suspicion of standard-form exculpatory
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mechanisms, however, are still notably weak.8 Yet even in China's
courts-which operate more like administrative agencies than
independent tribunals9-aging judges with little or no formal legal
training' are gradually being replaced by new ones with undergraduate
or graduate law degrees. In light of China's recent efforts to build an
effective legal system," it is not surprising that China sought to respond
language, and choice of remedies"); see also Weiqui Long, Intellectual Property Law in
China, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 63, 72-78 (1999) (discussing fundamental principles of
Chinese law relating to patents, trademarks, and copyrights, and describing these tenets
as being "in accordance with international treaties"); Xinqiang Sun, Reform of China's
State Owned Enterprises: A Legal Perspective, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 19, 27-28 (1999)
(discussing re-organization of Chinese state-owned enterprises "into joint-stock
enterprises with ownership rights, property rights, and clearly defined managerial
responsibilities"); Liming Wang, China's Proposed Uniform Contract Code, 31 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 7, 17 (1999) (discussing how common-law and civil-law contract principles,
as well as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, have contributed to the shaping of Chinese contract law).
8. See Pitman B. Potter, Review Essay, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture,
and Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 465, 466 (2004) (stating that although
"the Chinese governent... [has] accorded significant importance to the role of law in
socioeconomic relations[,] ... fealty to socialism ... diminishes the capacity for law to
serve as an independent source of restraint on government behavior"). "Problems with
law enforcement in practice are evident .. " Id. Numerous examples of the noticeable
weaknesses abound, such as: "piracy of intellectual property; indeterminate contract and
property rights; [and] inconsistent enforcement of administrative regulations." Id.
(citations omitted). But see Joseph Kahn, Deep Flaws, and Little Justice, in China's
Court System, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 21, 2005, at Al, 2005 W.L. 14853210 (stating that
"[h]undreds of thousands of new lawyers, stronger courts and a blizzard of Western-
inspired codes protect property, enforce contracts and limit police powers").
9. The Chinese judiciary is subordinate to the legislative branch with respect to
difficult questions of legal construction:
If the interpretations [of law] provided by the Supreme People's Court and the
Supreme People's Procuratorate are at variance with each other in principle,
they shall be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress for interpretation and decision.
Liu, supra note 4, at 42 (quoting a 1981 resolution of the NPC Standing Committee); cf.
Xin Chunying, What Kind of Judicial Power Does China Need?, 1 INT'L J. OF CONST. L.
58, 59 (2003) (stating, with regard to judicial reform, that "China is trying to reform a
system that was designed to serve a planned economy in a state where executive power
was supreme").
10. See Mary C. Szto, Towards a Global Bar: A Look at China, Germany, England,
and the United States, 14 IND. INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 585, 588 (2004) (stating that "[i]n
2001, China amended its Judges Law, Prosecutors Law, and Lawyers Law to increase the
qualifications required for these posts"). "One of China's major concerns is that many of
its judges and prosecutors have little or no university or college-level legal training.
Many judges actually attended law school after they became judges." Id. at 587.
11. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 2-4 (discussing the rise of a new legal culture in
China). The essay states:
The theme of law reform played a prominent role in the fiftieth anniversary
celebration of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Fifty official
slogans were released by the Communist Party to mark the occasion, including
"Promote political restructuring, develop socialist democracy, and improve the
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to the SARS 12 epidemic in 2003 with new legislative enactments
intended to address the resulting public health crisis.' 3 That course of
action is precisely what a legally oriented culture does: it turns social
problems into legal problems, and then addresses these concerns with the
enactment and enforcement of new laws designed to resolve or
ameliorate these problems. The "preference for statutory solutions to
community concerns reflects many things ... [including] a belief in the
rule of law, a trust in legislative processes, a preference for
9,14comprehensive solutions, and an eagerness for defined standards....
In the West, law plays a major role in fighting epidemics and other
health problems. 5 As three American professors recently wrote, law is
an essential part of public health practice.
Law defines the jurisdiction of public health officials and specifies
the manner in which they may exercise their authority. The law
is. .. used to establish norms for healthy behavior and to help create
the social conditions in which people can be healthy. The most
important social debates about public health take place in legal fora-
legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies-and in the law's
language of rights, duties, and justice. It is no exaggeration to say
that "[t]he field of public health ... could not long exist.., except
for its sound legal basis."'
6
Using laws to protect public health and to fight epidemics is not
new. During the plagues in London during the early 1 6 th century, an
array of legal provisions evolved "slowly and laboriously"'' 7 to address
socialist legal system!" and "Rule the country by law, and build a socialist
country that is ruled by law!"
Id. at 3 n.4.
12. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.
13. See Liu, supra note 4, at 49 (indicating that, in dealing with SARS, the Chinese
State Council "stressed an urgent need for establishing a legal framework and drafting
relevant laws and regulations to deal with public emergencies").
14. Vincent R. Johnson, America's Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30
ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 753 (1999) (discussing the United States).
15. Of course, the legal system can do more than seek to identify, treat, and contain
disease. It can also, for example, respond to the economic upheaval that follows in the
wake of an epidemic. See Lewis C. Vollmar, Jr., The Effect of Epidemics on the
Development of English Law from the Black Death Through the Industrial Revolution, 15
J. LEGAL MED. 385, 392-94 (1994) (discussing how epidemics influenced the adoption of
English labor laws, poor laws, and laws affecting agriculture and commerce).
16. Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59, 61 (1999); see also
Elizabeth B. Cooper, Social Risk and the Transformation of Public Health Law: Lessons
from the Plague Years, 86 IOWA L. REv. 869, 920 (2001) (stating that "in the realm of
public health, the legislature and related administrative agencies are the primary loci of
activity").
17. F.P. WILSON, THE PLAGUE IN SHAKESPEARE'S LONDON 71 (Oxford Univ. Press
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threats to public health.1 8 While "some [individuals] hoped to avoid the
plague through repentance, prayer, or superstition,"' 9 or "became
fatalistic and fell into a pattern of reveling, looting, and general
lawlessness,, 20 others sought to use legal regulations and information to
combat the crisis. The laws enacted during the London plagues
established rules relating to sanitation,2' identification and segregation of
infected houses22 or persons, 23 investigation of illnesses,24 rendition of
medical treatment,2 5 reporting of deaths,26 disposal of tainted goods,27
burial procedures, 28 and the legal mechanisms for enforcing the various
plague-orders.29
The laws adopted to fight plagues in England were likely modeled
after earlier legal provisions in France and Italy.30 In various ways, those
1927) (stating that the network of regulations was "constructed by the London
magistrates").
18. See id. at 14 (stating that "elaborate plague-orders of 1603 and 1625 were the
logical outcome of the theories of sixteenth-century England about the cause and the
cure" of the epidemic).
19. See Vollmar, supra note 15, at 395 (discussing social reactions to the plague and
stating that in England "[tihe primary psychological reaction to plague was fear, and a
crisis atmosphere frequently enshrouded the affected community").
20. Id.
21. See WILSON, supra note 17, at 16 (referring to sanitation); see also id. at 34-46
(discussing infected goods and burials).
22. See id. at 16 (stating that the General Orders addressed segregation); id. at 17
(stating that "the beadle saw that infected houses were marked" and discussing
responsibilities for "searching out infected houses, and for seeing that they were properly
shut up"); id. at 61 (stating that "[i]nfected houses were first marked with a special sign
in 1518"); see also Vollmar, supra note 15, at 395 (stating that "[o]ne [principal] weapon
that local governments used was isolation. All members of infected households, the sick
and the well, were confined to their homes.").
23. See WILSON, supra note 17, at 56 (indicating that no inhabitant of an infected
house "was allowed to walk abroad without carrying in his hand a white rod four feet in
length"); see also id. at 16 (stating that the General Orders addressed segregation).
24. See id. at 65 (stating that at one point during the plague "two 'honest and discreet
matrons' were appointed to search and view the body of every person dying in their
parish," and that at another point "two 'sober ancient women' were appointed in each
parish... to be viewers of the sick or those suspected of infection").
25. See WILSON, supra note 17, at 20 (stating that "[s]urgeons from the hospitals
were appointed to heal the plague-stricken"); see also Vollmar, supra note 15, at 395
(stating that "[p]hysicians and clergy frequently refused to attend the sick and the
dying").
26. See WILSON, supra note 17, at 18 (discussing the reporting of "the true number
of those who died").
27. See id at 34 (stating that "no clothes, garments, or bedding which had been near
or about any infected person should be sold or given away").
28. See id. at 17 (discussing responsibility for the "proper conduct of burials"); id. at
40-46 (discussing burial regulations).
29. See id. at 19 (stating that the examiner's duties were "to ensure that all orders
were duly observed" and to make specified appointments related to that purpose).
30. See id. at 62 (stating that "many plague-measures" were "borrowed from the
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types of regulations for fighting epidemics with better information and
mandatory health practices have been replicated and improved for
centuries to deal with all manner of diseases, 31 including smallpox,
tuberculosis, and more recently, HIV and AIDS. For example, early in
the twentieth century patients infected with polio were legally
quarantined in their homes or sent to special treatment facilities.32 And
during the 1918 influenza, which killed "more people than any other
outbreak of disease in human history, 33 New York City "required people
to obtain passes to travel. 34
The control of communicable diseases is an issue of continuing
importance, for natural biology ensures that there will always be
epidemics. 35  Protecting public health continues to require the
deployment of the "traditional tools of surveillance, vaccination,
isolation, quarantine, and treatment, often on an international scale. 3 6
Continent").
31. See, e.g., Gostin, et al., supra note 16, at 62-63 (stating that "[c]ommunicable
disease control has occupied American governments from the earliest year of European
settlement, and it was in response to epidemics that formal health agencies were first
created").
32. See JEFFREY KLUGER, A SPLENDID SOLUTION: JONAS SALK AND THE CONQUEST OF
POLIO 8-9 (2004) (discussing special facilities set up to house the newly afflicted and
signs that were posted on homes to enforce quarantines). See also JOSPEH J. ELLIS, His
EXCELLENCY GEORGE WASHINGTON 86-87 (2004) (stating that "only recently ... [have
historians] recognized that the American Revolution occurred within a virulent smallpox
epidemic of continental scope.... Washington ... understood the ravaging implications of
a smallpox epidemic within the congested conditions of his encampment, and he
quarantined the patients in a hospital at Roxbury.... Washington strongly supported ...
[inoculation]. It would take two years before inoculation became mandatory for all
troops..., but the policy began to be implemented in the first year of the war.... A
compelling case can be made that... [Washington's] swift response to the smallpox
epidemic and to a policy of inoculation was the most important strategic decision of his
military career").
33. JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE Epic STORY OF THE DEADLIEST
PLAGUE IN HISTORY 4 (2004). "The lowest estimate of the pandemic's worldwide death
toll is twenty-one million .. " Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 4.
35. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 872 (stating that "[h]istory teaches that new
plagues will continue to emerge"). The article states:
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was the wake-up call that
disturbed America from its mid-twentieth century slumber concerning the
dangers of communicable diseases. Until AIDS was identified in 1981, most
Americans felt largely impervious to health threats posed by viruses or
bacteria. . . . But, over the last twenty years, the (re)emergence of serious or
life threatening microbial-based conditions, such as Ebola, hantavirus, Lyme
disease, West Nile virus, and even newly-recognized strains of hepatitis have
underscored our vulnerability....
Id. at 871-72; see also Keith Bradsher & Lawrence K. Altman, Experts Confront Major
Obstacles in Containing Virulent Bird Flu, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 30, 2004, at Al (discussing
the "probable human-to-human transmission" of a virulent strain of avian influenza).
36. See Gostin, et al., supra note 16, at 98.
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II. The Chinese Law on SARS
In Chinese Law on SARS, 37 the first book published in English about
the new Chinese legislation,38 Chenglin Liu recounts the tale of China's
efforts to cope with the recent SARS epidemic. The story embraces all
of the themes one would expect in a drama where an unknown menace
threatened the health of hundreds of millions of persons not only in
China but across the globe.39  Liu lays out the evidence of the
government's initial denials that a crisis existed,4 ° its erroneous
assurances that both the public and visitors were safe,4' and its early
inability to appreciate the magnitude of the problem or provide effective
42guidance. Coupled with the media's failure to report effectively on
SARS,43 those circumstances, predictably, led to unwitting transmission
37. See Liu, supra note 4.
38. The Chinese SARS laws include four key legislative enactments. The two new
laws are the Regulations Dealing with the Outbreak of Public Health Emergencies
(effective May 12, 2003) [hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations"] and the Measures
on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Atypical Pneumonia (Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS) (effective May 12, 2003) [hereinafter referred to as
"Measures"]. See Liu, supra note 4, at 99-102 (summarizing Regulations); id. at 111-22
(translating Regulations); id. at 102-04 (summarizing Measures); id. 123-32 (translating
Measures).
The third major piece of SARS legislation, The Law of the People's Republic of
China on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases (effective February 21,
1989), was passed more than a decade earlier, but was republished on April 26, 2003.
See id. at 39 (discussing republication by Xinhua News Agency); id. at 133-41
(translating the infectious-disease law). The final key legislative enactment is the
Interpretation of Laws in Criminal Cases Regarding the Obstruction of the Prevention
and Control of the Outbreak of Infectious Diseases (effective May 13, 2003) [hereinafter
referred to as the "Interpretation"]. Id. at 42 (indicating that the Interpretation clarified
how existing criminal law applied to SARS); id. at 143-47 (translating the
Interpretation).
39. See Liu, supra note 4, at xiii (stating that "[a]fter SARS was first identified in
Southern China in November 2002, the disease spread quickly into more than twenty
countries"). "By late June 2003, when the Chinese government finally claimed victory
over the crisis, there were 5,327 persons infected with the illness with 349 deaths in
China." Id. The direct economic loss totaled approximately $18 billion between April
and June 2003. Id.
40. "The Government of Guangdong did not release the information about the
outbreak of... [SARS] until three months after the first case... [but] denied any
wrongdoing." Id. at 3.
41. See id. at 21-24 (discussing official assurances that Guangzhou and Beijing were
safe); id. at 24-28 & n.36 (discussing gross under-reporting of the number of SARS cases
by the Minister of Health, which may have contributed to his loss of that position).
42. A government spokesman eventually acknowledged that the "Health Ministry
was not well prepared for dealing with public health emergencies" and failed "to provide
effective guidance" to the medical community regarding SARS. Id. at 57.
43. See id. at 19-21 (discussing how, ironically, the Chinese media's widely praised
and unprecedented attention to the American war in Iraq overshadowed coverage of the
SARS crisis in China); id. 21-24, 32 (discussing the media).
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of the disease." Then, against a background of an increasing number of
SARS cases and general public ignorance of the truth,45 rumors4 6 and
speculation47 led to panic among the citizenry.48  Liu recounts the
individual acts of bravery that finally led to a proper course of action,49
as well as the inevitable vilification of those who failed to respond to the
crisis, 5° and praise for those who ultimately did.51 The book cites a
wealth of authority for its rendition of the facts (generally materials
published on the Internet, both in Chinese and English) and the story is
well told.
52
The outbreak of SARS coincided with the full session of the 1 0t
44. See id. at 12-13 (discussing "patient zero," who triggered the spread of the
epidemic to Hong Kong, Vancouver, Toronto, Singapore, and Hanoi during a trip to his
nephew's wedding); id. at 15-18 (discussing the Beijing "super spreader"); id. at 68
(indicating that "hospitals themselves started to spread the disease").
45. See id. at 18-19 (discussing the widespread ignorance of the epidemic in
Beijing).
46. Cf id. at 21 (stating that news reports "focused mainly on the rumors and panic
caused by SARS").
47. See id. at 18-19 (discussing "uninformed speculation" in Guangzhou).
48. See id. at 8-12 (discussing panic shopping and the predatory marketing and
pricing of supposed remedies, including white vinegar and iodized salt); id. at 65-68
(recounting "chaos" at two universities); id. at 72 (indicating that lack of confidence in
the medical system and fear of being infected in a hospital caused the number of hospital
visits to decline sharply and the death rate among patients with chronic illnesses to rise);
id. at 80 (discussing students who "fled" from Beijing universities); id. at 82 (detailing
escapes of migrant workers from mandatory quarantine); id. at 93 (describing riots in
rural areas); id. at 94 (indicating that a dog suspected of having SARS was buried alive).
Animal abuse is a common incident of ill-informed efforts to fight contagions. In the
United States, around the time of the First World War, many persons concluded the cats
were responsible for spreading polio, "so cats were bludgeoned and drowned by the tens
of thousands." KLUGER, supra note 32, at 16.
49. See Liu, supra note 4, at 28-30 (discussing Dr. Jiang Yanyong, who criticized
the Minister of Health for publicly understating the number of SARS cases, even though
"[w]histle-blowers in China are rare and usually face various sanctions").
50. See id. at 14 (recounting criticism of the government for its slow response to the
outbreak); id. at 30-32 (discussing the dismissal of the Minister of Health and the Mayor
of Beijing).
51. See id. at 31-32 (noting the praise and recognition accorded to the doctor who
insisted on revealing accurate information about the number of persons affected by
SARS); id. at 41 (describing the "great contributions" of the military to containing the
virus); id. at 52 (describing "high approval.., especially among students" of the new
government's open approach to the SARS problem).
52. There is also the occasional bon mot, as where Liu notes in an aside that because
official control of the media barred television footage of the 9-11 attacks on the World
Trade Center, media school students reportedly checked into luxury hotel rooms,
normally occupied by foreigners, so that they could watch full coverage on a Hong Kong-
based cable station. See id. at 20 n. 12. Similarly, Liu tells how the text of a letter critical
of the government, which eventually led to the removal of the Minister of Health and the
Mayor of Beijing, has been quietly removed from many websites and is now difficult to
locate. Id. at 29 n.40.
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National People's Congress, which elected a new Central Government.
5 3
Faced with mounting international concern about the SARS crisis,54 the
new government responded quickly. The government's "proactive"
55
approach was to enact new legislation, republish an important law, and
issue authoritative interpretations of existing criminal law provisions.5 6
The new laws addressed the epidemic by creating an expedited reporting
system for tracking SARS cases,57 establishing stations for "receiving
and quarantining SARS patients found among passengers on trains,''8
isolating and treating SARS patients and suspected cases of infection,59
creating specialized SARS treatment facilities,60 prohibiting hospitals
from refusing to minister to SARS patients, 61 promulgating contagion-
related procedures for common carriers,62 and imposing sanctions for
violations of the SARS laws.63 The government required better reporting
of SARS-related information-even from military hospitals-to civil
health authorities.64 Further, the government "launched a coordinated
plan to cover the costs for treating the poor who contracted SARS,
established sanctions for concealing, delaying, or falsely reporting
information,66 and constructed new facilities to relieve pressures on
metropolitan hospitals.67
Clearly explaining the structure and hierarchies of the Chinese
53. Id. at 35 (discussing Congress).
54. See id. at 48 (indicating that the first SARS death of a foreigner fueled
international concern).
55. Id. at 35.
56. See note 38, supra.
57. See Liu, supra note 4, at 55 (stating that the system "closely detailed the
responsibilities of governments at various levels"); id. at 58-62 (discussing the epidemic
reporting system); id. at 101 (same).
58. Id. at 55.
59. See id. at 55 (discussing policies requiring SARS treatment to be separate from
regular cases); id. at 73 (discussing the establishment of fever clinics at all hospitals); id.
at 97 (discussing treatment and quarantine measures).
60. See id. at 71 (discussing construction).
61. See id. at 74-76 (prohibiting refusal of service and unnecessary transfers).
62. See id. at 85-88 (discussing buses, subways, airlines, and railroads).
63. See, e.g., id. at 72 (relating to improper disposal of waste from infectious
diseases); id. at 102 (relating to violation of the Regulations related to health
emergencies); id. at 104 (relating to violation of the Measures for SARS prevention and
treatment); see also id. at 107-08 (relating to the re-published 1989 infectious disease
law).
64. See id. at 41 (requiring all hospitals in Beijing, regardless of affiliation, to report
to the Beijing Health Department).
65. Id. at 57.
66. See id. at 64-65 (discussing career-related penalties, such as demotion or
dismissal, and possible criminal prosecution).
67. "Amazingly," a brand new hospital, with 1000 beds, was built in only seven days
by 4000 workers (7,000 at peak time) and 500 machines. Id. at 69.
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68government, Liu offers a savvy analysis of why China's centralized
framework initially impeded the fight against SARS by causing key local
officials (who had been appointed by the Central Government) to focus
on "protection of local image and economic growth, 69 rather than on
public health, and by impeding "horizontal cooperation between
provinces.,70 The legislative enactments used to deal with SARS were
rooted not only in good health practices that are widely followed in other
countries, 71 but, as Liu explains, in prior Chinese law. Some of the
important legal provisions for fighting SARS had been enacted long
before the SARS crisis arose.72 If it took the passage of two new laws,
the republication of a third existing law on infectious disease, and the
issuance of key interpretations of criminal law to ensure that those in the
public health sector acted responsibly in the SARS crisis, 73 that was the
right course of action. As Liu argues, the SARS laws played a "crucial
role in containing the epidemic. 74 But the episode highlights the fact
that there is more to building a legal culture than passing laws. Laws
must be kept current, which was not done in the case of the earlier
infectious disease law. Laws must also be implemented through
appropriately targeted public education, institutionalization, and
enforcement. 75  On each of those grounds, the Chinese medico-legal
68. See id. at 35-45 (discussing state institutions and hierarchies).
69. Id. at 45.
70. Id. at 45 (stating that "[u]nder the unitary [centralized] system, emphasis is more
on the vertical subordination of the local government to the Central Government," rather
than on cooperation between local governments at the same level).
71. For example, the idea of using special facilities to treat those with communicable
diseases is ancient in origin. "In Venice[,] a lazaretto was established for the treatment
and isolation of plague-patients as early as 1403." See WILSON, supra note 17, at 74
(discussing proposals in England in the 17th century to erect "pesthouses where the sick
might be properly isolated, housed, and fed"). A "pesthouse" was an isolation hospital
located outside the town. Vollmar, supra note 15, at 396. In the 16th century, the English
had realized that "the usual method of shutting up the sound and the infected in one house
increased rather than decreased the infection." WILSON, supra note 17, at 75. Isolation
of those with communicable illnesses had many historical precedents.
[L]epers were historically banished to leper colonies and the insane were
locked away in asylums. Isolation techniques were utilized, especially when
fear of the disease was greatest and an identifiable group was involved....
Vollmar, supra note 15, at 396.
72. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 4, at 62 (discussing an article in the new SARS law
which reiterated provisions on releasing information to the public that were passed in
1989, but "largely ignored" by the government and related departments during the early
days of the SARS crisis).
73. See supra note 38.
74. Liu, supra note 4, at xiv.
75. See id. at 26 (indicating that the earlier Chinese Law on Treatment and
Prevention of Infectious Disease, passed in 1989, had not been updated for 14 years, and
as a result "the ill-drafted law became a legal ground that was cited both by Guangdong
officials and the Minister of Health as an excuse for the late reporting" of SARS cases).
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culture failed at the beginning of the SARS crisis. 7 6  Had that not
happened, a more timely medical response to SARS might have been
possible.77
If Chinese officials did not act soon enough to address the SARS
crisis, their inaction is as much an indication of human nature as a sign of
incompetence. Hoping that a problem will go away is nothing new.
During the London plagues in the sixteenth century, the magistrates
"often deferred action in the earliest stages of the infection in the hope
that it would die out. '78 However, Liu contends, with ample support,
that Chinese government officials did not simply fail to act. Rather, "the
initial information on the [SARS epidemic] was concealed and
misstated"79 and as a result "the deadly virus gained momentum and
erupted into a national epidemic. 8 °  In addition, initially there were
serious failures to communicate information. 81  "[I]t was almost
impossible for the health officials in Beijing to collect accurate
information on SARS from the military hospitals. 82 Moreover, as Liu
notes, "well trained doctors at a highly regarded hospital did not even
know what the symptoms of SARS were" months after the initial
outbreak of the disease.
83
76. See, e.g., id. at 37 (stating that infectious-disease law was essentially ignored in
the early stages of the SARS crisis).
Some persons argue that similar efforts in the U.S. also fall short.
Legislative efforts to answer... [legal and political questions relating to public
health] largely have been inadequate. Public health law has developed in
piecemeal fashion, responding to each crisis as it arises, resulting in an
amalgam of legislative provisions generally unprepared to deal with existing-or
future-threats to the public health. Indeed, the law frequently has revealed
itself to be ill-equipped to deal with the social and political issues that
inevitably attach to any wide-spread medical crisis.
Cooper, supra note 16, at 873; see also Gostin, et al., supra note 16, at 102 (stating that
"[tihe most striking characteristic of state disease control law, and one that underlies most
of its defects, is its overall antiquity").
77. If the 1989 infectious-disease law, which was still on the books but had fallen
into disuse, had "been closely followed from the onset of the outbreak, SARS could have
been effectively confined to the local regions." Liu, supra note 4, at 106.
78. See WILSON, supra note 17, at 72 (stating, apart from desertion of duties,
inaction is the most serious charge that can be levied against the London magistrates).
79. Liu, supra note 4, at xiii.
80. Id. at xiii; see also id. at 27 (arguing that if the government of Beijing and the
Ministry of Health had promptly released information about the spread of SARS, the
number of cases would have been "drastically reduced"); id. at 32 (stating that because
"the outbreak coincided with the congressional meeting.., the Health Ministry required
hospitals not to release the information about SARS," in order to "create a stable
environment").
81. See id. at 58 (indicating that initially "there was little information exchange
among various departments and medical institutions").
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id. at 27.
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III. Transparency in China
In the end, the Chinese Government ultimately adopted an "open
and transparent approach in dealing with SARS. ' 84 This was a major
departure from the traditional Chinese "black-box" method of strictly
controlling information about emergencies and accidents until the
problems ended or were resolved.8 5 As Liu tellingly writes, "[w]hen
SARS first broke out, the primary concern of the local leaders was not
how to control the disease, but how to control the information., 8 6 That
mindset changed once a new Central Government was installed. The
new government's decisions to deal with SARS openly and to adopt an
approach that placed a higher priority on public health and safety than on
economic gains are to be lauded. Those were difficult decisions 87
representing a "drastic change"88 from prior practices. Moreover, the
government's choice to utilize access to better information and
appropriate legal standards as the means for addressing and controlling a
major public health crisis is commendable.
IV. Paths Not Taken
It is interesting to consider some of the paths not taken by the
Chinese legislation on SARS. The key SARS laws, 9 which Liu has
translated in full, 90 are published along with other related legislative
enactments 91 in the appendices to the book. The SARS laws contain few
or no provisions relating to civil liberties, victim compensation, or
economic incentives for the development of new drugs to prevent or cure
SARS. In many countries, one would not be surprised to find provisions
addressing any or all of these subjects.92
84. See id. at 47; see also id. at 50 (noting that the "major legacy" of one high-
profile meeting was that "the Politiburo emphasized that no one was allowed to conceal
information on SARS").
85. Id. at 51.
86. Id. at 52.
87. See id. at 51 (stating that "choosing an open approach to combat SARS meant
that the government had to forgo economic gains and even suffer losses").
88. Id. at 52.
89. See note 38, supra.
90. See Liu, supra note 4, at 56 (attributing translation).
91. These other enactments include: the Notice Regarding Authorization on
Announcement of an Epidemic Situation, see id. at 149; the Notice Regarding the Related
Problems on the Strict Prevention of the Spread of SARS through Use of Public
Transportation, id. at 151-53; the Law of the People's Republic of China on National
Border Quarantine and Inspection, id. at 155-59; and The Implementing Rules of the Law
of People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases,
id. at 161-75.
92. See Julie Edwards, Statutory Note, Controlling the Epidemic: The Texas AIDS
Reporting Statute, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 399, 399 n.6 (1989) (indicating that American
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A. Civil Liberties
Serious communicable diseases, such as SARS, raise a host of civil-
liberties issues because those who have, or are accused of having, the
disease may suffer stigma and social hostility.93 The legal issues for
affected individuals range from defamation and invasion of privacy to
employment and housing discrimination.
In the United States, the liberty interests of individuals relating to
communicable diseases are afforded basic protection by various statutory
provisions, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)94 and the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 95 which
guarantee a threshold of confidentiality for personal information relating
to one's health. Individual interests are also protected by common-law
tort principles, including the rules defining the fiduciary obligations of
professionals, 96 the liability to third parties of doctors treating patients
legislatures responded to AIDS by passing laws prohibiting discrimination).
93. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 901 (discussing the role that stigma, social
hostility, and social risk play in the lives of persons with serious illnesses); cf Efr6n A.
Acosta, Comment, The Texas Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Act: Are
We Offering Enough Protection to Those Who Need it Most?, 36 Hous. L. REv. 1819,
1822-23 (1999) (noting that "[d]ue to the potential for unfair treatment and stigma faced
by HIV-positive individuals, there is a perception that HIV/AIDS status, and test results
in particular, must be kept under a veil of secrecy"). In Europe, during the Black Death
in the mid-fourteenth century, "[p]ogroms of Jews were a common expression of a search
for scapegoats or those thought guilty of spreading the plague; the burning of witches and
heretics was another." JOHN M. ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF EUROPE 140 (1996)
(characterizing these events as "signs of collective madness").
94. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (2005)). Among other things, the Americans with Disabilities Act requires
educational institutions to protect the confidentiality of certain information relating to
students. See generally Donald H. Stone, hat Law Schools Are Doing to Accommodate
Students with Learning Disabilities, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 19, 28 (2000) (stating that
"documentation about a student's disability is extremely sensitive and should be treated
with the utmost confidentiality by school officials").
95. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. HIPAA is well known for its provisions requiring privacy of
health information. See John M. Stephens, Integrating the Privacy Rule with Other
Privacy Obligations, 676 PLI/PAT. 167, 171 (2002) (stating that "[b]etween the language
of HIPAA, passed in 1996, and its final rule released in December 2000, which provides
implementation specifications, health information privacy requirements are much more
clearly spelled out" than under prior law). The regulations adopted pursuant to HIPAA
limit the use or disclosure of patient information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2005).
96. Under American law, the physician-patient relationship is typically regarded as
fiduciary as a matter of law. See, e.g., Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354, 358
(Ohio 2002) (stating that "[t]he physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one based on
trust and confidence"). A non-privileged revelation of confidential patient information is
a breach of fiduciary duty which may give rise to tort liability. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (stating that "[o]ne standing in a fiduciary relation with
another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty
imposed by the relation"). "The unauthorized disclosure of nonpublic medical
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with communicable diseases, 97 and the availability of redress to victims
for slander,98 libel,99 and public disclosure of private facts.100 Various
laws also accommodate civil-liberties interests. For example, for better
or worse, virtually all states now allow parents to opt out their children
from compulsory vaccination programs for religious reasons, and more
than a dozen states provide "philosophical" opt-outs as well.'
In the United States, one might expect civil liberties concerns to be
raised as part of the debate over how to respond appropriately to a new
epidemic. 10 2  It is not surprising, therefore, that special provisions on
information relating to a patient may be actionable under a variety of [other] theories,
including invasion of privacy, breach of contract, or violation of statute. Some states
simply recognize an independent common-law tort action for breach of confidence in the
physician-patient setting." See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN
AMERICAN TORT LAW 298 (3d ed. 2005) (citing Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715
N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999)).
97. In some American states, duties to third parties may be imposed on physicians
treating patients with communicable diseases. See DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester
County, Inc., 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990) (claim stated by third person against doctor who
negligently advised a patient with a communicable disease); see also Tenuto v. Lederle
Labs., 687 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1997) (recognizing a duty to warn parents of risks to their
health resulting from vaccination of their child); Osborne v. United States, 567 S.E.2d
677 (W. Va. 2002) (holding that the state's medical professional liability act permits a
third party to bring suit against a health care provider for foreseeable injuries proximately
caused by negligent treatment of a patient). But see Santa Rose Health Care Corp. v.
Garcia, 964 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1998) (finding no duty to inform wife of husband's
possible exposure to HIV).
98. Accusing someone of having a "loathsome disease" is slander per se. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 572 (1977) (stating that "[o]ne who publishes a
slander that imputes to another an existing venereal disease or other loathsome and
communicable disease is subject to liability without proof of special harm").
99. See Doe v. Merck & Co., 2001 WL 34133510, *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (granting
summary judgment on liability in favor of a woman who alleged that she was libeled by a
product brochure which falsely indicated that she was infected with herpes).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (stating that "[o]ne who
gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public"). But see Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997) (refusing to
recognize, in a suit based upon alleged revelation of HIV status, an action for invasion of
privacy based on public disclosure of private facts). See generally Keith J. Hilzendeger,
Comment, Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort Law Protect the Unwarranted
Disclosure of a Person's HIV-Positive Status?, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 187 (2003) (stating that
"the Restatement approach is a good starting point," but arguing that in some respects the
"Restatement definition does not go far enough to protect the interest of HIV-positive
individuals in controlling who is and is not aware of their HIV status so that they can
avoid being stigmatized by others").
101. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why are So Many Americans
Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 353, 389 (2004).
102. Cf Edwards, supra note 92, at 403 (stating that "[a]n inherent friction in public
health issues is the necessity that individual liberties must suffer for the benefit of the
general public"); Edward A. Fallone, Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal to
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confidentiality are found in many AIDS-related statutes. 10 3 In Texas, for
example, the results of an AIDS test are generally confidential,'0 4 and a
person who willfully or negligently discloses those results is subject to a
tort action for damages.105
The Chinese SARS laws do not expressly address issues of
confidentiality. Moreover, there is no indication in Liu's book that civil
liberties issues played a significant role in the Chinese government's
decisions about how to deal with SARS. Indeed, Beijing Telecom's
suspension of service to Internet bars at the government's suggestion
during the height of the SARS crisis seems at least as much calculated to
interfere with civil liberties as to contain the spread of SARS. Liu writes
that entertainment venues in Beijing "are often overcrowded and without
good air circulation systems,' ' 06 and therefore "[l]arge-scale gatherings
at night clubs, Internet cafes, cinemas and theaters were of big concern
for health officials. 10 7 While some Internet cafes may be large, many
are small. One of the authors of this review has spent many hours in
Internet cafes in Beijing, Jinan, and Shanghai, and without exception
they were all less crowded than the typical Chinese restaurant. While
some Chinese Internet cafes have bad ventilation systems, others open
directly onto the street, so that computer keyboards and seats are coated
with dust. Whether the Beijing Internet cafes were closed to stop the
spread of SARS-as opposed to slow the spread of SARS information-
is at least open to question.
There is one civil liberties related provision in the SARS laws that
deserves special attention. That provision concerns whistle-blower
protection. The SARS laws provide that there is a "right to inform the
People's government... of any hidden dangers of an emergency, and...
to make a report of the local government's failure to perform its duties in
Quarantine Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 441, 448 (1988) (discussing
how public safety and civil rights issues must be weighed in formulating an effective
response to an epidemic); Wendy E. Parent, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise
and Fall of the Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 477
(1996) (stating that in the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, "an era when epidemics
were common, individual right was unquestionably held to give way to saluspopuli").
103. See Acosta, supra note 93, at 1822 (stating that "recent legislation has increased
the protection of HIV- and AIDS-related information because of its sensitive nature"); id.
at 1823 (indicating that the "Texas Communicable Disease Prevention and Control
Act... provides that HIV test results are confidential and limits the persons to whom
those results may be disclosed").
104. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103 (Vernon 2005) (defining when
otherwise confidential test results may be released).
105. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.104 (Vernon 2005) (discussing civil
liability).
106. Liu, supra note 4, at 90.
107. Id. at 90.
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accordance with the relevant provisions in dealing with the emergency to
the higher People's government or related department. .. More
surprising is that the SARS laws state that the "People's governments at
or above the county levels shall reward the unit or individual who has
made contributions to alerting the government of the emergency."'
0 9
The arguable importance of these provisions is amplified by the fact
that, as the SARS epidemic developed in China, the conduct of one
whistle-blower, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, who contacted Time magazine after
being rebuffed by the Chinese media, "changed the whole course of the
battle against SARS." 10  However, in thinking about the new SARS
laws, the first thing to note is that the Regulations do not say that there is
a right to contact the media, and indeed a contrary 1989 rule is still in
effect."' Read strictly, the SARS laws simply say that there is a right to
tell those higher up on the governmental chain of command. In that
sense, the "right to inform" is not a startling development in civil
liberties, but a reinforcement of traditional Chinese centralizing
principles. Moreover, as Liu notes:
While the law provides that the informers should be rewarded, it does
not specify or refer to any punishment for retaliation by the local
government. The major concern for most people is how to go about
life after tipping off the government's failure. As long as the
informers live under the same authority, they would find themselves
under constant pressure from the local government." 2
Viewed skeptically, the whistle-blower provisions in the SARS laws
are not as good as they first appear.
B. Compensation for Victims
As noted above, under United States law, victims of infectious
disease may be entitled to tort compensation from those responsible for
communicating the disease or breaching obligations of confidentiality.
While Chinese law provides criminal sanctions for intentionally or
negligently spreading an infectious disease' 13 and other forms of
irresponsible SARS-related conduct,' 14 neither that law nor other SARS-
108. Id. at 63.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 28-29.
111. See id. at 63-64 (according to the provision, "no unit or individual is allowed to
release and announce epidemic information to foreign media or publish unannounced
epidemic information without the authorization of the Health Department").
112. Id.at63.
113. See id. at 84 (quoting relevant provisions).
114. For example, a person is subject to criminal sanction for "marketing fake or
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related provisions speak of tort liability for spreading SARS or disclosing
information related to SARS. This is not surprising. Under traditional
communism, the dan wei (work unit) provided cradle-to-grave care to
each Chinese citizen. 15 It supplied housing, medical services, education,
employment, and retirement income-the types of economic benefits
that are often at issue in tort litigation in western countries.
Consequently, there was traditionally little need for a tort system and
little tort litigation.1 16 Moreover, a western-style tort system would have
made little sense in a country where few persons had the wealth from
which a judgment could be collected.
China's recent move toward capitalism (in everything but name) has
undermined the assumptions that previously led to a lack of interest in
tort liability. Today in China, the mass marketing of consumer products
(including automobiles),'17 the growth of an economically privileged
middle class,"' and the demise of the care-giving role of the work unit' 19
shoddy medicine," "[s]preading horrific rumors," or "improperly disposing of objects
contaminated with infectious disease." Id. at 105 (quoting criminal provisions).
115. Cf Chunying, supra note 9, at 60 n.3 (stating that "[t]he 'unit,' or dan wei, is the
institution in which a citizen is employed. Under the planned economy, almost
everybody who lives in a city belongs to a unit and the unit plays an important role in
people's lives. Unit leaders are charged with taking care of all aspects of life, including
settling of disputes.").
116. See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, The Limits of Law in Addressing
China's Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 125, 147 (1997) (stating that "the
Chinese system defines very narrowly the range of activities actionable under tort law");
Robert Force & Xia Chen, An Introduction to Personal Injury and Death Claims in the
People's Republic of China, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 245, 246 (1991) (stating that, unlike in the
U.S., personal injury litigation is not "big business" in China); Walter Gelhorn, China's
Quest for Legal Modernity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 1, 16 n.40 (1987) (stating that "'tort law'
cases that fill the dockets of American civil courts are rare in China; a victim of an
accident is likely to recoup out of pocket expenses for medicine and the like, but not
much else"); Charles Zhen Qu, An Outsider's View on China's Insider Trading Law, 10
PAC. Rim L. & POL'Y J. 327, 345 (2001) (stating that deceit is not a cause of action under
Chinese tort law); Lingling Zou, Legal Issues of Doing Reinsurance Business in China, 7
J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 15, 32 (1998) (stating that "China does not have an American style
tort system").
117. See From "Bicycle Kingdom" to World's Fastest-Growing Auto Market,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 4, 2004, available at 2004 WL 95405097 (stating that
"owning a family car has come within, or nearer, the reach of the country's growing
middle class").
118. See Chinese Banks to Expand Bank Card Business in Hong Kong, CHINA NEWS
DIG., Jan. 19, 2004, available at 2004 WL 65926286 (indicating that "China's middle
class is predicted to grow to 160 million by 2010 from an estimated 60 million people in
2002"); cf Liu, supra note 4, at 96 (stating that "[w]ith increasing discretionary spending
in China, more and more people can now afford to travel overseas").
119. Cf David Murphy, The Lost Generation: Homelessness Is on the Rise Among
Children in China, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 19, 2004, at 48, available at 2004 WL
55767447 (quoting a Beijing-based lawyer as stating that "[t]en years ago...
[homelessness] was not such a serious problem, the work units used to take care of these
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are all creating pressures for a legal regime to govern compensation for
accidents. Work is currently underway to draft a new code12° which,
when enacted, is likely to go a long way in China toward ensuring that
persons who carelessly injure others will be held liable for the damages
they cause.
C. Economic Incentives
While the SARS laws do not provide compensation to persons who
contract SARS or suffer other related harm, they do create policies
"rewarding and compensating medical staff' who become infected with
SARS. 121 These are sensible provisions that encourage the rendition of
needed professional medical services. However, given the priority that
China places on economic development, one might have expected the
new SARS laws to go further in terms of creating economic incentives
for combating the disease. Legislatively crafted incentives can
sometimes be used effectively to spur the development and marketing of
drugs that are needed to fight epidemics and other communicable
diseases.
In the United States, a variety of economic incentives have been
employed to address various public health concerns. 122 The development
of new treatments for AIDS has been spurred by "fast tracking" the
regulatory process or making "early-access" to drugs feasible in special
cases. 123  The Orphan Drug Act 124 has stimulated development of
problems, but not now").
120. See Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 603, 617 (2003) (mentioning on-going efforts to draft China's first tort law); see
also Yao Hui, Recent Development of Chinese Civil Law: Focus on Drafting the Civil
Code and Jus Rerem (Law of Real Rights), 5 J. CHINESE & COMp. L. 289, 295 (2002)
(questioning whether, in China, the law of torts should be separated from the law of
obligations).
121. Liu, supra note 4, at 55.
122. See generally Patricia C. Kuszler, Balancing the Barriers: Exploiting and
Creating Incentives to Promote Development of New Tuberculosis Treatments, 71 WASH.
L. REV. 919 (1996).
123. See id. at 958-61 (discussing expedited FDA approval processes (originally
provided to stimulate development of AIDS therapies, pursuant to which "disease
severity and urgency of market need" became relevant factors), and "early-access"
provisions); see also Mandy Wilson, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More
Generic Favored Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug Companies to Pull the Plug on
Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 503 (2001-02) (listing the different incentives provided by
the Act and stating that "[t]hese rewards include federal funding for research and clinical
trials, beneficial tax credits, and the exclusive right to market a qualified drug for a
limited period").
124. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1998). See generally David Duffield Rohde, The
Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125
(2000) (offering a descriptive overview of the Act and analyzing the incentives provided
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treatments for rare diseases, or for diseases primarily affecting the poor,
by creating financial incentives to encourage research and production.
125
An amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act prompted the
development of a swine flu vaccine by eliminating the liability fears of
potential manufacturers by allowing victims of a new vaccine to seek
recovery from the government.126 And the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act 127 has promoted the distribution of important vaccines by
immunizing manufacturers from liability in cases where victims who
suffer adverse reactions accept non-fault compensation from a special
fund.12
8
The present lack of an effective tort regime in China means that
provisions immunizing manufacturers from liability for SARS-related
drugs would do little to spur the development of such products.
However, other forms of economic incentives might have been used to
promote research and marketing of pharmaceuticals and other forms of
treatment. The SARS laws do provide that "[s]cientific research on
SARS prevention and treatment shall be greatly promoted"'129 and that
"[i]nternational exchange and cooperation... shall be... supported."' 
30
But specific economic incentives are absent from the laws.
IV. Conclusion
In earlier times, efforts to combat epidemics were often hampered
by the lack of information about the diseases and by ineffective legal
regimes. Those obstacles frequently still exist, albeit in different forms.
and determining whether they are effective in promoting pharmaceutical developments
for the treatment of rare diseases).
125. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 283h note (stating that "[b]efore 1983, some 38 orphan drugs
had been developed ... [but that since] the enactment of the Orphan Drug Act, more than
220 new orphan drugs have been approved and marketed in the United States and more
than 800 additional drugs are in the research pipeline"); Kuszler, supra note 122, at 955
(stating that "Congress provided for tax credit... of fifty percent of the cost of the
clinical trial during the time the designated orphan drug is seeking approval").
126. See Kuszler, supra note 122, at 962-63 (discussing amendment).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 33 (2005).
128. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 96, at 26 (stating that "[u]nder the Act, a fatal
injury results in an automatic payment of $250,000, and persons who are injured receive
compensation for virtually all past and future economic losses, plus no more than
$250,000 for actual and projected pain and suffering and emotional distress.
Theoretically, victims may reject an award under the Act and sue in tort, but the doctrinal
limitations imposed by the Act on tort actions make that an undesirable course.... The
Act applies only to seven compulsory childhood vaccines and does not include vaccines
used primarily by adults or noncompulsory vaccines administered to children."); Kuszler,
supra note 122, at 963-64 (discussing the no-fault compensation scheme created by the
federal statute).
129. Liu, supra note 4, at 78.
130. Id.
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Information is often mixed with misinformation, and sometimes the facts
fail to reach the right parties. Legal regulations may fail to anticipate
new medical developments, and out of date laws can impede, rather than
promote, the treatment of disease. In an increasingly inter-connected
world where diseases travel ever faster to far parts of the globe, there is a
continuing challenge to furnish medical service providers with the best
information and the greatest opportunity to effectively treat contagious
diseases. 131
Chinese Law on SARS, the seventh volume in William S. Hein &
Company's Chinese Law Series, 132 is a valuable addition to the emerging
English-language literature about the new legal system in China. 33 In
the book, Chenglin Liu offers both a detailed account of how the Chinese
government responded to a major health crisis and an effective critique
of the legal measures that were adopted. He perceptively identifies
serious shortcomings in the SARS laws, 134 but also acknowledges their
strengths and the progress they represent in building a Chinese legal
culture. Liu is right to hope that by "utilizing the primary materials and
analysis in this book, legal scholars and public health experts... [will be
better able] to prevent epidemic diseases, both in China and throughout
the world."'
135
131. See Leonard J. Nelson, International Travel Restrictions and the AIDS Epidemic,
81 AM. J. INT'L LAW 230, 233 (1987) (indicating that international cooperation in the
field of public health can be traced back to the expansion of international travel in the
early nineteenth century, which spread epidemic diseases, such as cholera, plague, and
yellow fever).
132. The earlier books include: volume 1, THE 1997 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION (1998); volume 2,
THE CONTRACT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION
AND INTRODUCTION (1999); volume 3, THE AMENDED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND
THE CRIMINAL COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2000); volume 4,
GUIDE OF CHINESE COPYRIGHT LAW STUDIES (2000); volume 5, RESEARCH GUIDE TO
CHINESE PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE (2002); and volume 6, COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA
(2002). See LIU, supra note 4, at ii.
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